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I. Introduction
Literature has shown that unemployment suffers from
a certain degree of persistence (Arulampalam et al.,
2000; Stewart, 2007). On the one hand, state depen-
dence in unemployment can be explained by observed
and unobserved characteristics that persist across time
and make one more likely to be successively unem-
ployed. On the other hand, it has been shown that
experiencing unemployment in a given period
increases in itself the chances of suffering unemploy-
ment again in the future. This scarring effect is known
as genuine state dependence. The sources of genuine
state dependence in unemployment may be due to the
disincentive effects of unemployment insurance, the
decay of human capital, the decline in search intensity,
discouragement or habituation and stigma effects.
In this article, we focus on stigma effects and discour-
agement as sources of state dependence in unemploy-
ment.1 Several authors have shown that stigma effects
exist: employers are more reluctant to employ someone
who has been unemployed for some time than someone
who has moved directly from job to job or has been
unemployed less often and for shorter periods (Blau
and Robins, 1990; Lockwood, 1991; Omori, 1997;
Clark et al., 2001). Biewen and Steffes (2010), conform-
ing with Lockwood’s (1991) hypothesis, have recently
shown that when the unemployment rate rises and
deviates from its trend, state dependence in unemploy-
ment decreases, indicating that employers are less sus-
picious about unemployed individuals during periods
of economic downturn. On the contrary, they stigma-
tize individuals who are unemployed when the unem-
ployment rate is low. When the disadvantageous effect
of past unemployment status interacts with the level of
past unemployment, as suggested in Omori (1997), no
significant effects are found – leading the authors to
conclude that evidence for stigma effects in Germany is
relatively weak.
However, throughout their paper, Biewen and
Steffes (2010) assume that the discouragement of unem-
ployed individuals is constant throughout the business
cycle and does not depend on the unemployment rate.
Here we find more plausible the idea that when the
unemployment rate rises, individuals’ discouragement
increases as they are aware that it has become more
difficult to find a job. As a result, we expect state
dependence in unemployment to be positive and sig-
nificant when the unemployment rate rises and the
discouragement of workers does so in parallel. So, this
article is innovative in explaining the persistence of
unemployment throughout the business cycle with not
only stigma effects but also discouragement while using
the same methodology as Biewen and Steffes (2010).
1 For the remainder of this article, we refer to genuine state dependence when describing state dependence.



















































Our analysis is based on the Spanish component of the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP),
1994–2001. The sample consists of an unbalanced
panel of 4160 men (16 126 observations). Women are
excluded as it is difficult to predict the effect of career
interruptions on the results. Furthermore, we restrict
the analysis to those aged over 25 and below 56 in
order to avoid the interference of education or early
retirement decisions. We exclude self-employed work-
ers and individuals in the agriculture, forestry, fishing,
hotel and restaurant industries given that seasonal
unemployment is important in these sectors.
We predict the cyclical unemployment risk by regres-
sing the unemployment rate against a linear time trend
in each of the Spanish regions. The residuals are inter-
preted as deviations from the unemployment rate
trend. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows that even
when our sample only includes 8 years, there is enough
variation in the data [-3.67%, 4.38%].2
In order to measure discouragement among unem-
ployed individuals, we use the answers to the question:
‘How good do you think are your chances of finding
the kind of job you are looking for within the next 12
months?’. There are four possible answers: ‘good’, ‘not
good not bad’, ‘bad’ and ‘very bad’.3 Naturally, we
believe individuals feel discouraged if they think their
chances of finding a job are low. Note that we include
the category ‘Unemployed not looking for a job’, indi-
viduals that we also wish to consider in our analysis.
As shown in Table 1, the percentage of unemployed
individuals that feel discouraged about finding a job
goes hand in hand with the unemployment rate. Note,
for instance, that in 1996, when the unemployment rate
was highest (23.9%), about 38.7% of the unemployed
would state that their chances of finding a job were very
bad. But when the unemployment rate was the lowest
(12.0%) in 2001, only 13.7% of the unemployed would
answer in the same way. Moreover, these results are
independent of the percentage of unemployed that
declared that they were looking for a job.
As for the other explanatory variables, we follow a
standard specification that includes age, age squared,
marital status, number of children in the household,
educational qualifications, immigrant origin and,
finally, region and year dummies.
III. Econometric Model
In order to obtain a baseline against which to com-
pare, we first estimate a dynamic random-effects pro-







3Xit þ vi þ mit ð1Þ
where i ¼ 1, 2, . . . ,N refers to adult individuals and
t ¼ 1, . . . ,T are the number of periods under study.
uit1 is the individual unemployment status of the pre-
vious wave, so we expect 1 to be positive and signifi-
cant capturing the importance of state dependence in
unemployment. ytuit1 is the interaction between past
unemployment status and the cyclical unemployment
risk, so we believe 2 to be negative, meaning that the
consequences of having been unemployed are smaller
when the unemployment rate deviates positively from
its trend. This would imply the existence of stigma
effects as state dependence would be higher for the
unemployed in periods of economic growth.
Our new specification adds discouragement as a










þ ci þ eit
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where uit1dit1 is the interaction between the indivi-
dual feeling of discouragement when unemployed
at t 1.We expect b1 to be positive as state dependence
in unemployment may be reinforced if the individual
Table 1. Unemployment rate, percentage of unemployed feeling they have ‘very bad’ chances to find a job and unemployed looking
for a job in Spain, 1994–2001
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Unemployment rate 23.71 22.62 23.91 22.57 18.45 15.38 13.62 12.01
% of unemployed and ‘very bad’ chances 41.73 46.28 38.67 29.81 23.26 19.34 15.30 13.77
% of unemployed looking for a job 94.02 95.50 95.87 95.33 96.44 95.65 96.46 92.92
Source: Own calculations on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP).
2We do not know of any other annual panel that is longer and includes the variables needed for our analysis (namely
discouragement).















































feels his/her chances of finding a job are low.
ytuit1dit1 is the interaction between the cyclical unem-
ployment risk, past unemployment and discourage-
ment. If there is stigmatization, b2 should be negative.
ytdit1 relates the level of discouragement among indi-
viduals looking for a job (regardless of activity status)
and the cyclical unemployment risk. As argued, the
unemployment rate is not only observable for employ-
ers but also for those looking for a job who may feel
more discouraged at times when the unemployment
rate is high. Therefore, we believe b3 to be positive.
Xit are the observed explanatory variables and ci is
the individual-specific effect. It is important to take
into account unobserved heterogeneity because ignor-
ing it overestimates the degree of state dependence. On
the other hand, the treatment of initial conditions is
crucial in the estimation of dynamic panel data models
given that the start of the observation windowmay not
be the same as the beginning of the outcome experi-
ence. Following Wooldridge (2005), we find the den-
sity of the dependent variable from the second period
onwards to be conditional on the initial condition and
the average of the time-varying explanatory variables,
Xi.
4 Thus, ci is specified as follows:
ci ¼ a1 þ a2ui0di0 þ a
0
3Xi þ ki ð3Þ
where ki is assumed to follow a zero-mean normal
distribution and variance s2ki . Finally, eit is the idiosyn-
cratic error term. Parameter estimates are obtained by
Conditional Maximum Likelihood.
IV. Results
Column 1 inTable 2 replicates the samemodel specified
in Biewen and Steffes (2010). As expected, the existence
Table 2. Dynamic random-effects probit model for unemployment status in Spain (selected parameters), 1994–2001 (SEs are given
in parentheses)
[A] [B]
Unempl. status (t-1) 0.598*** (0.051)
Unempl. status (t-1) · discouragement level (t-1):
Looking job, good chances 0.460*** (0.131)
Looking job, not good not bad 0.658*** (0.082)
Looking job, bad 0.572*** (0.070)
Looking job, very bad 0.723*** (0.080)
Not looking job 0.461*** (0.178)
Unempl. status (t-1) · cyclical unempl. rate (t) -0.120*** (0.023)
Unempl. status (t-1) · discouragement level (t-1) · cyclical unempl. rate (t):
Looking job, good chances 0.005 (0.142)
Looking job, not good not bad -0.254*** (0.078)
Looking job, bad -0.282*** (0.059)
Looking job, very bad -0.278*** (0.065)
Not looking job -0.139 (0.093)
Discouragement level (t-1) · cyclical unempl. rate (t):
Looking job, good chances –0.064 (0.123)
Looking job, not good not bad 0.155** (0.065)
Looking job, bad 0.196*** (0.051)
Looking job, very bad 0.159*** (0.056)
Cyclical unempl. rate (t) 0.088*** (0.019) 0.073*** (0.019)
Unemployment status at initial condition 1.695*** (0.076)
Unemployment status · discouragement at initial condition:
Looking job, good chances 1.471*** (0.197)
Looking job, not good not bad 1.544*** (0.123)
Looking job, bad 1.660*** (0.098)
Looking job, very bad 1.779*** (0.096)
Not looking job 1.673*** (0.232)
sk 0.75*** 0.73***
Log-likelihood -4153.88 -4150.49
Source: Own calculations on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP).
Notes: The values in italics refer to time.
***, ** and *Significance at 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively.
4 Following Stewart (2007), we add the time average in order to allow for a correlation between the individual-specific effects















































of positive state dependence in unemployment is con-
firmed: past unemployment increases in itself the
chances of current unemployment. However, its effect
is greater during periods of low unemployment as
shown by the negative sign of the interaction between
past unemployment status and the cyclical unemploy-
ment rate. Thus, the results show evidence of stigma
effects in the Spanish labour market.
Discouragement also plays a significant role in
explaining the persistence of unemployment as
shown in Column 2 in Table 2. Indeed, state depen-
dence in unemployment increases in size and explana-
tory power in relation to the individual level of
discouragement when looking for a job. As a matter
of fact, average partial effects indicate that being
unemployed and believing one’s chances of finding a
job are ‘very bad’ increases by 7.4% the probability of
still being unemployed the following year. Instead,
among those that feel their chances of finding a job
are ‘good’, this percentage falls to 4.7%. Interestingly
enough, the scarring effect of unemployment is posi-
tive and highly significant even among those that are
well motivated to find a job.
As for the unemployed not looking for a job, state
dependence in unemployment exists but is not espe-
cially large. This is readily explained by the fact that
those not looking for a job may be in a variety of
different situations, for instance, waiting to start a
job or preparing for retirement.
Our model confirms the existence of stigma effects in
Spain but shows how they depend on the individual
level of discouragement and only affect those that
believe their chances of finding a job are ‘not good
not bad’, ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’. Instead, among indivi-
duals that feel positive about their chances of finding a
job, no evidence of stigmatization is found. For exam-
ple, they might show greater enthusiasm for themselves
in job interviews, which may avoid stigmatization.
Similarly, our model indicates that stigma effects are
not relevant for unemployed people not looking for a
job, which goes in line with the hypothesis of
stigmatization.
Moreover, note the positive association between the
cyclical unemployment risk and the different levels of
discouragement. The results suggest that in years
when the unemployment rate rises, people become
aware that finding a job is more difficult and hence
feel more discouraged.
The other variables have the expected sign, for
instance, married individuals and university degree
holders are less likely to be unemployed while immi-
grants are more likely to be so. Unobserved hetero-
geneity is positive and highly significant, underlying
the importance of controlling for it.
V. Conclusions
Our results suggest that stigma and discouragement
explain the persistence of unemployment in the labour
market. While it is true that the stigmatization of
unemployed individuals becomes less important dur-
ing periods of a rising unemployment rate, this effect is
counterbalanced by the increased discouragement of
those searching for a job.
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Fig. A1. Unemployment rate by year and region in Spain and unemployment trend (fitted values)
Source: Own calculations on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP).
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